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INTo A LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT CoNTRAcrr-In 1924, the plaintiff, while working as an employee of the defendant corporation, suffered an injury which resulted in the loss of his leg. During his period of convalescence the plaintiff was
visited by the district superintendent of the defendant corporation and was
assured that the corporation would pay for his medical expenses and furnish
him with a lifetime job in exchange for his promise to forbear from suit. Upon
recovery, the plaintiff returned to work and served the defendant in various
capacities until 1949, at which time he was discharged without cause. The
plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for breach of contract and the
trial court entered a judgment in his favor. On appeal, held, reversed. A lifetime employment contract is not enforceable against a corporation unless there
is proof that the superintendent had definite authority, either under bylaw or
action of the board of directors, to make the contract or unless the contract was
ratified or its benefits accepted with full knowledge of the circumstances. Pullman Co. v. Ray, (Md. 1953) 94 A. (2d) 266.
A managing agent of a corporation ordinarily has the implied authority to
hire employees when such employment is usual and necessary and within the
scope of the corporate purposes.1 But it is also generally accepted that a lifetime
employment contract does not fall within the reasonable limits of this implied
authority.2 While in the principal case there was the additional factor that the
superintendent had the authority to settle claims, this would not seem to warrant deviation from the general rule, and the court is supported by ample precedent in its refusal to imply authority to make a lifetime contract under these
circumstances.3 This extreme reluctance to imply authority is due not only to
the unusual character of such a contract, but also stems from the notion that a

lAtholwood Development Co. v. Houston, 179 Md. 441, 19 A. (2d) 706 (1941);
Slocum v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 67 Wash. 220, 121 P. 67 (1912); 1 MECHEM, AcBNCY,
2d ed., §988 (1914).
2 Heaman v. E. N. Rowell Co., 261 N.Y. 229, 185 N.E. 83 (1933); General Paint
Corp. v. Kramer, (10th Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 698; Camey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 162
N.Y. 453, 57 N.E. 78 (1900). See annotation in 49 L.R.A. 471 (1900).
3 See cases collected in 87 A.L.R. 1277 (1933), supporting the view that a claim
agent does not have the implied authority to make a lifetime employment contract in settlement of a claim for injuries. While some of the cases cited in this annotation held that the
corporation was bound by the lifetime contract, those decisions can be distinguished either
on the ground that they were based on the apparent authority of the claim agent or due to
the fact that the question of the agent's authority was not litigated.
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long-term contract is objectionable per se because it tends to bind the hands of
future directors.4 While some courts have gone so far as to hold that even a
board of directors has no power to make a contract of employment for the lifetime
of the employee,5 or even beyond the term of office of the presene board, 6 the
general rule appears to be otherwise. If the lifetime contract is authorized by the
corporation and based on adequate consideration, it will ordinarily be sustained. 7
It is submitted that the necessities of corporate practice make this the sounder
approach and, in any event, the future directors could generally discharge the
lifetime employee with the corporation responding in damages for breach of
contract. Even though this power is now recognized in the directors, the courts
have consistently refused to take the next step and imply this authority in a
subordinate officer.
Absent any express authority, the court held the contract unenforceable
because the corporation had neither actual nor constructive knowledge on which
to base ratification or estoppel.8 While this lack of knowledge precludes binding
the corporation on either of these theories, it is submitted that the way is still
open to apply the principles of apparent authority which would not require
knowledge of the benefits on the part of the corporation.9 Three elements are
needed to hold the corporation liable under this theory: (I) there must be some
affirmative acts stemming from the corporate principal which clothe the agent
with appearance of authority; (2) it must be reasonable for the plaintiff to rely
upon this appearance of authority; (3) the plaintiff must in fact rely upon this
apparent authority to his detriment. 10 In the principal case, the first and third
requisites seem to be satisfied, the fighting issue being whether the plaintiff was
justified in supposing that the superintendent had authority to make the lifetime contract, which is a question of fact for the jury. With justified detrimental
4 The rationale of this theory is that corporation statutes contemplate the right of stockholders to change the management of the affairs of the corporation by providing for periodic
election of directors. If corporate directors can enter contracts giving persons of their choice
employment for life, the power of the stockholders, as well as the future directors, will be
to some extent dissipated.
5 Clifford v. Firemen's Mut. Ben. Assn., 232 App. Div. 260, 249 N.Y.S. 713 (1931),
affd. 259 N.Y. 547, 182 N.E. 175 (1932); Beers v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 Hun 75,
20 N.Y.S. 788 (1892).
6 Edwards v. Keller, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 133 S.W. (2d) 823; Beaton v. Continental Southland Savings & Loan Assn., (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 101 S.W. (2d) 905.
7 Heaman v. E. N. Rowell Co., Inc., supra note 2; Riefkin v. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., (D.C. Cir. 1923) 290 F. 286; Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109,
32 N.E. 802 (1892).
8 For the distinction between these two theories see M:scHBM, OuTLINEs OF AGENCY,
4th ed., §220 (1952).
9 In the principal case, a vigorous dissent was entered on the ground that the facts
warranted application of both the theory of estoppel and apparent authority. However, the
dissenting judge then proceeded to find that the corporation had sufficient knowledge, either
actual or chargeable, to invoke estoppel. This ultimate finding would seem to cast doubt
upon whether a strict application of apparent authority was advocated even in the dissent.
10 Richmond Guano Co. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., (4th Cir. 1922) 284
F. 803; AGENCY RESTATEMENT §7 (1933); 2 C.J.S., Agency §96 (1936) and cited cases.
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reliance as the basis of apparent authority, knowledge of the contract on the part
of the principal would seem to be immaterial. Those cases which have enforced _
lifetime employment contracts against corporations have generally done so under
the theory that the agent was possessed of this apparent authority in his relations
with the particular employee.11 However, the Maryland court is not without
precedent in refusing to consider apparent authority in connection with this
problem.12 Perhaps it can even be said that the numerical weight of authority
follows this view. But in this line of cases, there has generally been no mention
of apparent authority in the reported decisions and the reasons for rejecting this
theory must, therefore, be left to conjecture. Possibly the foremost reason for this
omission is again found in the reluctance to permit transactions which may bind
future directors and the courts have refused to permit a question which could
have this consequence to be placed in the hands of a jury.13 It is submitted that
this danger is more illusory than real and that the better reasoned cases have
applied the test of apparent authority to the problem of long-term employment
contracts.
Peter Van Domelen, S.Ed.

11 Eggers v. Armour & Co. of Delaware, (8th Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 729; Royster
Guano Co. v. Hall, (4th Cir. 1934) 68 F. (2d) 533; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Cox, 145
Ky. 667, 141 S.W. 389 (1911).
12Horvath v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 58 Wyo. 211, 131 P. (2d) 315 (1942);
Babicora Development Co. v. Edelman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 54 S.W. (2d) 552; Rennie
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (1st Cir. 1910) 176 F. 202.
13 It is also suggested that the courts may have felt that, as a matter of law, a reasonable
man is never justified in assuming that a corporate agent would have this authority. Query
the role of constructive notice of the charter (and/or bylaws) under this test. In this connection see comment in 17 BoST. UNIV. L. REv. 176 (1937).

